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MANDATORY NARRATED ULTRASOUNDS:
A FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE ON
ABORTION REGULATIONS
Abigail Tubin*
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right to terminate a
pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, many state legislatures have passed myriad
regulations intended to complicate the process of obtaining an abortion.
These regulations include “informed consent” provisions, such as the
mandatory narrated ultrasound, which impose strict disclosure requirements
on physicians who seek to perform abortions. Since these regulations compel
physicians to speak when they otherwise might not, these laws implicate the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. As a result, physicians looking to
perform abortions have an alternative avenue, apart from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, for challenging the constitutionality of
the mandatory narrated ultrasound and other “informed consent”
regulations.
Due to a lack of clarity from the Supreme Court, circuit courts and
scholars are currently divided over the constitutionality of mandatory
narrated ultrasound laws under the First Amendment. This Note discusses
the lower courts’ varying approaches to analyzing mandatory narrated
ultrasound laws and demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence complicates the First Amendment analysis. Ultimately, this
Note suggests a more streamlined test that lower courts can use when
analyzing mandatory narrated ultrasound laws and concludes that these
laws violate physicians’ First Amendment rights to free speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Jen Ferris was nineteen years old when she found out that she was
pregnant.1 As the daughter of a woman who became a mother at twenty-one
and the granddaughter of a woman who became a mother at fifteen, Jen knew
that she did not want to have the same experience.2 So she went to a medical
clinic to begin the difficult process of terminating her pregnancy.3
When Jen arrived at the clinic, she learned that the doctors would have to
perform an ultrasound, during which the doctors would play the heartbeat of
the unborn child and describe the fetus in detail.4 The doctors could not
perform the abortion unless Jen agreed to the ultrasound.5 Knowing that this
decision was the right one for her, Jen entered an examination room alone
and laid on her back as the doctors played the sound of the heartbeat and
detailed the fetus.6
The ultrasound did not change Jen’s mind about terminating her
pregnancy,7 but it left her with a feeling of shame that has not yet gone away,
1. See Anna Silman, What It’s Like to Endure a Forced Ultrasound Before Your
Abortion, THE CUT (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.thecut.com/2019/12/forced-ultrasoundabortion-what-its-like.html [https://perma.cc/84KH-SB3Q].
2. See id. According to a 2004 survey, 25 percent of women who have an abortion
indicate, as the reason for having the procedure, that they are “not ready for a(nother)
child/[t]iming is wrong.” Luu Ireland, Who Are the 1 in 4 American Women Who Choose
Abortion?, UMASS CHAN MED. SCH. (May 30, 2019) (alteration in original),
https://www.umassmed.edu/news/news-archives/2019/05/who-are-the-1-in-4-americanwomen-who-choose-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/GUC6-SHHS].
3. See Silman, supra note 1.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. Studies show that most women seeking abortions are sure of their decision
and do not change their minds as a result of state-mandated narrated ultrasounds. See, e.g.,
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even years later.8 As the doctors described the fetus, Jen could sense that
they “wanted [her] to feel a certain way.”9 Only after becoming pregnant
with her first son and sitting in the ultrasound room once again did Jen realize
that she “was part of this kind of convoluted political theater” when the state
inserted itself into her examination room so many years ago.10
Beginning in 1973 with the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,11 the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability12 under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.13 However, state legislatures have
attacked this right for decades.14 Since Roe, state legislatures have
collectively passed over 1190 restrictive abortion laws.15 Today, states have
numerous regulations in place that limit access to abortion in some way,
including (1) licensing requirements,16 (2) gestational limits,17 (3)
state-mandated counseling,18 (4) mandatory waiting periods,19 and (5)
mandatory narrated ultrasounds.20
Many of these regulations impose informed consent requirements on
abortions.21 The doctrine of informed consent requires physicians to make
sufficient disclosures to their patients so that they may make informed
USHMA D. UPADHYAY ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF A MANDATORY PRE-ABORTION
ULTRASOUND VIEWING LAW: A MIXED METHODS STUDY, PLOS ONE, at 1–2 (2017),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0178871&type=printab
le [https://perma.cc/R3TH-X8BE].
8. See Silman, supra note 1. Jen suffered from “retroactive shame” during her pregnancy
with her first son, agonizing over whether she “wasted” her healthy pregnancy should this
pregnancy go wrong. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Viability is the point at which the fetus is able to live outside the mother’s womb. See
id. at 160.
13. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”); see also
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
14. See generally T.J. Raphael & Amber Hall, In the 45 Years Since Roe v. Wade, States
Have Passed 1,193 Abortion Restrictions, THE WORLD (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:30 PM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-01-22/45-years-roe-v-wade-states-have-passed-1193abortion-restrictions [https://perma.cc/42SD-KP68].
15. See id.
16. Thirty-six states require that abortions be performed by a licensed physician. An
Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/Q2DE-Z8PS] (Jan. 1, 2022).
17. Forty-three states prohibit abortions after a certain point, with the exception of an
emergency to protect the mother’s health. See id.
18. Eighteen states mandate that a woman receive counseling prior to obtaining an
abortion. See id. The counseling, which may differ among states, provides information
concerning the ability of the fetus to feel pain and the purported link between abortion and
breast cancer, among other things. See id.
19. Twenty-five states require a woman to wait usually around twenty-four hours between
the time of counseling and the abortion procedure itself. See id.
20. For a detailed discussion of mandatory narrated ultrasounds, see infra Part II.
21. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less
Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2011).
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decisions about their medical care.22 Numerous states have passed bills that
impose unique informed consent requirements on abortions.23 Kentucky, for
example, requires that a physician perform an ultrasound on any woman
seeking an abortion, during which the physician must provide a medical
description of the fetus and play the sound of the heartbeat24 (“mandatory
narrated ultrasound”).
Following Roe, parties have typically challenged these antiabortion
restrictions as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.25 However, parties looking to challenge abortion informed
consent provisions have another avenue for potential recourse: the First
Amendment.26 While states like Kentucky characterize mandatory narrated
ultrasound regulations, among other provisions, as “informed consent,”
legislators have almost certainly intended for these regulations to complicate
the process of obtaining an abortion, rather than to provide critical
information to a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy.27 However,
since these “informed consent” provisions compel a physician to speak when
they otherwise might not, parties have challenged these regulations as
violations of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.28
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of various
other abortion “informed consent” provisions,29 it has not directly addressed
the mandatory narrated ultrasound.30 As a result, litigants challenging
mandatory narrated ultrasounds on First Amendment grounds have had
mixed results.31 In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services
v. Lakey32 and EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear,33 the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, respectively, both upheld mandatory narrated ultrasound
provisions as constitutional regulations of medical practice under the First
22. See id. at 19 (“A physician seeking his patient’s consent to a medical intervention is
morally and legally obligated to explain to his patient the information she needs to know to
make an informed decision about how to proceed.”).
23. See id. at 3.
24. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2022). Under the statute, a woman seeking
an abortion cannot give informed consent unless the physician performs the narrated
ultrasound. See id.
25. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016)
(wherein abortion providers challenged state-imposed admitting privileges and surgical center
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. See Sawicki, supra note 21, at 3–4; see also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:
Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 378 (2008)
(“Although couched in the protective terms of informed consent, these statutes are
unabashedly meant to transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes
of the potentially aborting mother.”).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v.
Meier, a Sixth Circuit case addressing the constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound
provisions. See 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019) (mem.).
31. See infra Part II.
32. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
33. 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
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Amendment.34 However, the Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Camnitz35
invalidated a mandatory narrated ultrasound provision as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.36
This Note addresses the divide in the lower courts over the
constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions. Part I outlines
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Specifically,
Part I explains the First and Fourteenth Amendment frameworks for
analyzing compelled speech provisions in the abortion context. Part II
presents the debate among the lower courts and scholars surrounding the
constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions. Part III argues
that, applying the Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra37 (NIFLA), the mandatory narrated
ultrasound is an unconstitutional regulation of the physician’s speech under
the First Amendment. Further, Part III proposes that, in order to reconcile its
competing characterizations of “informed consent,” the Supreme Court
should revise its compelled speech holding in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey38 to invalidate the aspects of “informed
consent” provisions that go beyond describing the medical procedure and its
risks. Lastly, Part III contends that, even in light of the compelled speech
holding in Casey, mandatory narrated ultrasounds are distinguishable from
the provisions upheld in Casey and are thus unconstitutional.
I. ABORTION REGULATION AND COMPELLED SPEECH
The First Amendment is a critical avenue through which litigants can
challenge compelled speech provisions intended to complicate the process of
obtaining an abortion, such as the mandatory narrated ultrasound. To
understand the relationship between the First Amendment and mandatory
narrated ultrasound provisions, it is important to consider the Supreme
Court’s declaration of the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and
state legislatures’ subsequent responses to the Supreme Court’s abortion
cases. Part I.A traces the constitutional development of the fundamental right
to terminate a pregnancy. Part I.B discusses states’ responses to Roe v. Wade
and the evolution of compelled speech provisions in the abortion context.
Part I.C explains the First Amendment framework for analyzing compelled
speech generally, while Part I.D outlines the Supreme Court’s various
responses to compelled speech provisions, specifically in the abortion
context.

34. See id. at 432; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580. For a more detailed discussion of Lakey and
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, see infra Parts II.A–B.
35. 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
36. See id. at 250. For a more detailed discussion of Stuart, see infra Part II.A.
37. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
38. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and a Woman’s Right to Choose
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”39
Since its ratification after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause has come to encompass two distinct doctrines: procedural
due process and substantive due process.40 Procedural due process, on the
one hand, guarantees certain procedural protections before the state can
deprive individuals of their life, liberty, or property.41 Substantive due
process, on the other hand, protects certain unenumerated42 rights from state
encroachment, regardless of the procedures employed.43
Substantive due process empowers the Supreme Court to carve out
fundamental rights rooted in the constitutional principles of due process.44
While developing the doctrine, the Supreme Court offered a number of
different formulas for identifying fundamental rights protected under the Due
Process Clause.45 However, under modern substantive due process, the
Court applies only a single test when deciding to recognize a new
fundamental right: whether the right is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” as evidenced by our traditions.46 Under this approach, the Court
recognizes fundamental rights that have a long history in the United States
and beyond.47
When a party challenges a state regulation under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court must first determine
whether the claimed right is one that warrants constitutional protection under
the test described above.48 If the Court decides that the proposed right is, in
fact, a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, the Court must then
determine whether the regulation at issue unconstitutionally encroaches upon

39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40. See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and
Who We Want to Be with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. SOC.
CHALLENGES 220, 222–23 (2010).
41. See id. at 223.
42. Unenumerated rights are those rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment that
are not specifically listed in the text of the Constitution, either in the Bill of Rights or in
subsequent amendments. See id. at 224; see also Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights,
Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 787 (2001) (defining
“unenumerated rights” as “those not ‘specified and declared by We the People’”) (quoting
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1291 (1992))).
43. See Shuler, supra note 40, at 224.
44. See id. at 224, 226.
45. See Hon. Jon O. Newman, The Births, Deaths, and Reincarnations of Substantive Due
Process, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 12–24 (2018) (tracing the history of the Supreme Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence).
46. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
47. See Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Traditionalism,
66 SMU L. REV. 841, 858–81 (2013) (outlining the use of tradition in a variety of Supreme
Court substantive due process cases).
48. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; see also Turner, supra note 47, at 858–81.
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that right.49 To do so, the Court employs the highest standard of review,
known as “strict scrutiny,” upholding the regulation only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.50
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court considered the right to
terminate a pregnancy for the first time. In its 1973 landmark case of Roe v.
Wade, the Court addressed a challenge to provisions of the Texas Penal Code
that criminalized the procurement of an abortion, except with respect to “an
abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother.”51 Under the first step of the Due Process analysis,
the Court considered whether the right to terminate a pregnancy is a
fundamental right.52 Tracing the history of abortions from Ancient Greece
through the modern day, the Court determined that there was a tradition of
abortion before viability in the United States and around the world until the
latter half of the nineteenth century, when states first began proscribing
abortion at all times other than to save the mother’s life.53 Assured that this
centuries-old tradition satisfied the substantive due process test, the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a
fundamental right to privacy, which includes a woman’s right to terminate a
pregnancy.54
After determining that there is a fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy under the Due Process Clause, the Court considered whether the
Texas abortion ban infringed on that right.55 Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court set forth a trimester framework to measure the constitutionality of state
abortion statutes.56 Under this framework, the state could not regulate
abortion in the first trimester, as the Court found that the state’s interests in
(1) preserving maternal health and (2) protecting potential life were not
compelling at this stage of pregnancy.57 Beginning with the second
trimester, the state could regulate abortion so long as “the regulation
reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health.”58
Only after the start of the third trimester could the state regulate and
completely proscribe abortion in order to protect the potential life of the
unborn child.59
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 118.
52. See id. at 129 (“The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas statutes is that
they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to
terminate her pregnancy.”).
53. See id. at 129–47.
54. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
55. See id. at 164–65.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 163–64. The Court noted that, until the end of the first trimester, abortion
mortality rates are actually lower than childbirth mortality rates. Id. at 163.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 163–64. The state’s interest in protecting potential life is compelling during
the third trimester because, at that time, the fetus has reached viability and has the capacity to
survive outside the mother’s body. See id. at 163.
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The trimester framework remained the constitutional test for abortion
regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment until 1992, when the Supreme
Court took another look at the fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy.60
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,61 the Court
reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding” that there is a fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability.62 However, the plurality departed
from Roe’s trimester framework, reasoning that the framework was too
“rigid” and not essential to Roe’s core holding.63 In its place, the plurality
advanced a new constitutional standard to measure abortion regulations: the
undue burden standard.64 Under the undue burden standard, a state
regulation that has the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” is invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment.65 Although less protective than the strict
scrutiny review underlying Roe,66 the undue burden standard still protects the
right to terminate a pregnancy from substantial state interference.
The Court then applied the undue burden test to various provisions of
Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act67 and upheld a series of “informed
consent” regulations.68 The Court first held that the requirement that a
physician inform a woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of
the abortion, and the probable gestational age of the unborn child did not pose
an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion.69 In fact, the Court noted
that these disclosures are consistent with the disclosures required in other
medical procedures.70 Next, the Court held that the state may require doctors
to “inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials
relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have
no direct relation to her health.”71 Lastly, the Court upheld the requirement
that a physician inform a woman of the availability of information relating to

60. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
61. The Court addressed both First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to various
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989.
See id. at 844–45. The provisions at issue included an informed consent provision that
required the doctor performing the abortion procedure to inform the woman of (1) the nature
of the procedure; (2) the risks of the procedure; (3) the “probable gestational age of the unborn
child”; and (4) the availability of printed materials describing the fetus, potential child support,
and agencies that provide alternatives to abortion. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 3205
(2022). For a detailed discussion of the Court’s First Amendment analysis in Casey, see infra
Part I.D.
62. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46.
63. See id. at 873.
64. See id. at 876.
65. Id. at 877.
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973).
67. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 3201 (2022).
68. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–83.
69. See id. at 881–82.
70. See id. at 881 (“[A]s with any medical procedure, the State may require a woman to
give her written informed consent to an abortion. In this respect, the statute is unexceptional.”
(citation omitted)).
71. Id. at 882.
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assistance for women who carry to full term.72 The Court noted that
informing women of the availability of these materials is a “reasonable
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion.”73
The Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey remain incredibly controversial.74
Many states continue to challenge the undue burden test and the
underpinnings of the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.75
B. States’ Responses to Roe v. Wade
Prior to Roe, the vast majority of states outlawed abortion in nearly all
circumstances.76 However, when the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
rendered those blanket bans unconstitutional, state legislatures that wished to
limit access to abortion had to construct new regulations that would achieve
the same effect without running afoul of Roe and its progeny, including the
Court’s controlling precedent in Casey.77 It was in this context that
current-day compelled speech provisions, including the mandatory narrated
ultrasound, arose.78 This section provides an overview of state abortion
regulations both before and after Roe, highlighting the methods by which a
number of states responded to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy.
Prior to the nineteenth century, abortion was neither criminalized nor
regulated in the United States.79 However, the second half of the nineteenth
century marked the “first right-to-life movement,” which heralded a number
of criminal bans on abortions.80 By 1900, almost every state in the country
had outlawed “all abortions except those necessary to save a woman’s life.”81
72. See id. at 883.
73. Id.
74. See Raphael & Hall, supra note 14.
75. On December 1, 2021, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization. See Oral Argument, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
No.
19-1392
(Dec.
1,
2021),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/19-1392
[https://perma.cc/ZE8F-DXZ5] (choose “Oral Argument—December 1, 2021,” from left
panel); see also Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392) (mem.). Although it is unclear whether and
how the Supreme Court will modify Roe and Casey, the decision could have a significant
impact on the right to terminate a pregnancy. See Amy Howe, Majority of Court Appears
Poised to Roll Back Abortion Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2021, 1:04 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/12/majority-of-court-appears-poised-to-upholdmississippis-ban-on-most-abortions-after-15-weeks/ [https://perma.cc/WWQ4-FP9X].
76. See Sarah Kliff, CHARTS: How Roe v. Wade Changed Abortion Rights, WASH. POST
(Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/22/charts-howroe-v-wade-changed-abortion-rights/ [https://perma.cc/U4M6-924S].
In those states,
abortions necessary to protect the life or health of the mother remained legal. See id.
77. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for
the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 245–46 (2013).
78. See id. at 246.
79. See id. at 249.
80. See id. The movement was led by physicians who hoped to reserve for themselves
the power to decide whether to perform abortions in individual cases. See id.
81. Id.
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This remained true through the mid-1960s, at which time forty-four states
outlawed abortion in nearly all circumstances that did not threaten the life of
the mother.82 Although states began liberalizing their abortion regulations in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, pre-Roe abortion regulations remained
stringent.83
In 1973, Roe immediately invalidated every state criminal ban on
abortion.84 However, rather than settling the controversy surrounding
abortion, the decision only created new incentives for pro-life activists to
usher in a “second right-to-life movement.”85 Initially, the movement sought
to reinstate criminal bans and overturn Roe altogether.86 Many states enacted
abortion regulations that blatantly defied Roe’s trimester framework, while
others attempted to push Roe’s boundaries by enacting requirements intended
to make abortions burdensome and difficult to access.87 Prior to Casey, these
attempts to undermine Roe proved largely unsuccessful when challenged in
court as violative of the Due Process Clause.88
However, Casey provided states with a new roster of constitutionally
permissible abortion regulations when it lowered the level of constitutional
scrutiny for abortion laws from strict scrutiny to an undue burden standard
and upheld a number of so-called “informed consent” requirements.89 In
response, states began to pass not only provisions identical to those upheld
in Casey but also new “informed consent” regulations that the Court might
uphold under the new undue burden standard, including the mandatory
narrated ultrasound.90 Thus, the Court’s decision in Casey facilitated the
replacement, in large part, of outright attacks on Roe’s central holding with
“incremental” restrictions intended by lawmakers to chip away at the right to
terminate a pregnancy from a different angle.91
Today, state abortion regulations run the gamut of restrictions.92
Thirty-six states require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician,
and nineteen states require an abortion to be performed in a hospital after a

82. See Kliff, supra note 76.
83. See id. In the years preceding Roe, only four states—Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and
Washington—legalized abortion in nearly all cases before viability. See id. Another thirteen
states allowed abortions in some cases. However, the remaining thirty-three states continued
to ban abortion in nearly all circumstances. See id.
84. See Borgmann, supra note 77, at 252.
85. See id. at 252–53.
86. See id. at 253.
87. See id. at 253–54. Examples included requirements that abortions be performed in
hospitals and that minors receive parental consent prior to obtaining an abortion. See id.
88. See id. at 254–55. The Burger Court did, however, uphold parental consent laws, so
long as they allowed minors to proceed without their parents’ consent if it was in their best
interests. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147–48 (1976). The Court also upheld bans on
the use of public funds and facilities for indigent women’s abortions. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 466–74 (1977).
89. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–83 (1992).
90. See Borgmann, supra note 77, at 259.
91. See id. at 258–62.
92. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 16.
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specified point in the pregnancy.93 Under the umbrella of “informed
consent,” eighteen states mandate that, prior to an abortion, individuals
receive counseling that includes information on either (1) the purported link
between abortion and breast cancer, (2) the ability of the fetus to feel pain, or
(3) the long-term mental health consequences of terminating a pregnancy.94
In addition, six states mandate that a physician perform an ultrasound on each
woman seeking an abortion, during which they must display and describe the
image for the patient.95
The recent proliferation of state antiabortion laws, masked as “informed
consent” regulations, highlights the fragility of Roe v. Wade in contemporary
society.96
C. The First Amendment and Compelled Speech
Because the “informed consent” provisions upheld in Casey and
subsequently enacted by various state legislatures compel abortion providers
to speak when they otherwise may not, the provisions implicate the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech.97 Given the Supreme Court’s
declaration in Casey that at least some of these provisions pass the undue
burden standard under the Fourteenth Amendment,98 the First Amendment
provides an important channel through which litigants can challenge
“informed consent” provisions that compel physician speech. This section
provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to compelled speech.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”99 As the Supreme Court has clarified,
freedom of speech “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.”100 This principle derives from the idea that a
constitution that “guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind” cannot

93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/
state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/38AL-XUBJ] (Jan. 1, 2022).
The six states that have mandatory narrated ultrasound laws are Arkansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and
Wisconsin all allow the patient to look away from the image. See id. In addition, Louisiana
and Texas allow the patient to decline to listen to the description. See id.
96. See Raphael & Hall, supra note 14.
97. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (“To be sure,
the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated.”).
98. See id. at 881–82.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). In Wooley, the Court addressed
challenges by a Jehovah’s Witnesses couple to New Hampshire’s requirement that
noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with “Live Free or Die.” See id. at 707.
The Court invalidated the requirement as a violation of the First Amendment, stating that
“where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some,
such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the
courier for such message.” Id. at 717.
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at the same time “[leave] it open to public authorities to compel him to utter
what is not in his mind.”101
When the Court confronts a statute that appears to infringe on the First
Amendment right to free speech, it must first determine whether the regulated
speech is content-based or content-neutral.102 If the regulation targets the
communicative content of the speech itself, then it is content-based and
subject to strict scrutiny review.103 Under strict scrutiny, a law is
constitutionally valid only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.104 If the regulation limits communication without regard to the
message conveyed, then it is content-neutral and the Court applies
intermediate scrutiny.105
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is
constitutionally valid if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest through means that are substantially related to that interest.106
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,107 the Court recognized an exception to strict scrutiny review of
content-based regulations in the context of commercial speech.108 Zauderer
involved a First Amendment challenge to an Ohio rule requiring legal
advertisements that mention contingent fee rates to disclose whether clients
would be liable for costs even if their claims were unsuccessful.109 The
appellant, an Ohio attorney, argued that the disclosure requirement violated
the First Amendment, as it authorized the state to control the content of legal
advertisements.110
While the Court recognized that “commercial speech,” such as the
advertisement at issue, warrants some degree of First Amendment protection,
it made clear that the protection is less extensive than that afforded to
“noncommercial speech.”111 With regard to state-compelled disclosures in
the commercial context specifically, the Court noted that “the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by
101. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
102. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018)
[hereinafter NIFLA]. The Court previously stated that “[m]andating speech that a speaker
would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech” and is thus a
content-based regulation of speech. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795
(1988).
103. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
104. See id.
105. More commonly known as time, place, and manner regulations, these laws limit
communication, regardless of the message conveyed. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189–201 (1983).
Examples of content-neutral regulations include laws that (1) ban billboards in residential
communities and (2) laws that ban noisy speeches near hospitals. See id. at 189–90.
106. See id. at 190. But see Martin H. Reddish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 125–27 (1981) (arguing that the Court’s
application of intermediate scrutiny to neutral regulations provides weak protection for the
right to free speech).
107. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
108. See id. at 651.
109. See id. at 633.
110. See id. at 636.
111. See id. at 637.
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the value to consumers of the information such speech provides.”112 As such,
legal advertisers do not have a constitutionally protected interest in excluding
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” from their
advertisements.113 The Court applied rational basis review114 and found the
disclosure requirement to be constitutional because it was rationally related
to the state’s interest in preventing consumer deception.115
This line of cases establishes the general framework through which the
Supreme Court analyzes compelled speech provisions under the First
Amendment. Since many “informed consent” abortion regulations implicate
physician speech, the Supreme Court’s approach to abortion regulations
draws heavily from its compelled speech jurisprudence.116
D. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Abortion Regulations That Compel
Physician Speech
The Supreme Court has addressed only a handful of times the
constitutionality of abortion “informed consent” provisions that compel
physician speech. This section outlines the Court’s evolving approach to
abortion-related compelled speech provisions, with specific emphasis on the
few instances in which the Court invoked the First Amendment principles
discussed above. These decisions provide a framework for analyzing the
mandatory narrated ultrasound, a compelled speech regulation that the Court
has not explicitly addressed.
Following its decision in Roe, the Supreme Court took up challenges to
two different abortion “informed consent” regulations. In City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,117 the Court addressed
challenges to the City of Akron’s abortion ordinance that, among other
things, required that a physician inform a woman seeking to terminate her
pregnancy of the availability of alternatives to abortion, including adoption
and agency assistance after birth.118 The Court invalidated the provision,

112. Id. at 651.
113. Id.
114. Under rational basis review, “a law will be upheld if it is rationally related to any
legitimate government purpose.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is
Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402 (2016) (emphasis
omitted).
115. See id. The Court has not yet clarified whether rational basis review applies when the
compelled disclosure is “purely factual and uncontroversial” but when the state’s interest in
compelling disclosure is something other than preventing consumer deception. See Jennifer
M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth?: Compelled Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 556–63 (2012). Consequently, the circuit courts are
split on whether the Zauderer standard applies to varying state interests. See id. at 558–63
(discussing the circuit split between the First and Second Circuits and the D.C. Circuit over
the scope of Zauderer’s holding).
116. See infra Part I.D.
117. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
118. See id. at 423–24 n.5.
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reasoning that it went far beyond providing information relevant to the
procedure.119
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,120 the Court again invalidated a state “informed consent”
provision regulating abortion.121 Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of
1982 required physicians to present women seeking abortions with certain
information, including the availability of (1) prenatal and neonatal care,
(2) child support from the father, and (3) printed materials listing alternatives
to abortion.122 Relying on its decision in Akron, the Court invalidated
Pennsylvania’s “informed consent” provision, reasoning that “[m]uch of this
would be nonmedical information beyond the physician’s area of expertise
and, for many patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate.”123
However, only six years after Thornburgh, the Court changed course. In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court again
took up challenges to an abortion “informed consent” provision,124 but this
time the Court specifically addressed the argument that the provision violates
the physician’s First Amendment free speech rights.125 Rather than follow
its reasoning from Akron and Thornburgh, the Court disposed of the First
Amendment argument in one paragraph:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion,
and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the
requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the
State here.126

In doing so, the Court strayed from years of precedent regarding compelled
speech provisions in abortion laws.127 In its place, the Court provided a

119. See id. at 442–49. The Court proclaimed that “much of the information required is
designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it
altogether.” Id. at 444.
120. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
121. See id. at 758–71.
122. See id. at 760–61.
123. Id. at 763. The Court stated that “[u]nder the guise of informed consent, the Act
requires the dissemination of information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it
advances no legitimate state interest.” Id.
124. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844–45 (1992).
125. See id. at 884.
126. Id. at 884 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
127. See id. at 882. In addition to its First Amendment holding, the Court also addressed
the Fourteenth Amendment implications of the undue burden test on the “informed consent”
provisions at issue in Akron and Thornburgh:
To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the
government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus, those cases go too far,
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framework for assessing abortion regulations that compel physician speech:
so long as the regulation compels physicians to provide information that
informs the consent of a woman seeking an abortion, it does not violate the
First Amendment.128 The provisions upheld in Casey—including the
requirement that a physician inform a woman of the availability of printed
materials detailing alternatives to abortion—provide examples of the types
of compelled speech regulations that pass constitutional muster under this
new test.129
Twenty-six years later, the Court addressed yet another challenge to an
abortion compelled speech provision under the First Amendment. In NIFLA,
the Court took up a challenge to the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act130 (“FACT Act”).131 The
California State Legislature passed the FACT Act to regulate crisis
pregnancy centers, pro-life organizations that offer a limited range of free
pregnancy resources and counseling.132 According to supporters of the
FACT Act, the main goal of these crisis pregnancy centers was to discourage
women from seeking abortions.133 To counteract this messaging, California
imposed certain disclosure requirements on these centers.134
The FACT Act differentiated between licensed and unlicensed centers,
mandating unique disclosures for each.135 The statute required licensed
facilities to disseminate on site a government-drafted notice, which states that
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost
access to comprehensive family planning services[,] . . . prenatal care, and
abortion for eligible women.”136 The clinics were required to either (1) post
the notice in the waiting room, (2) print and distribute the notice to all clients,
or (3) provide a digital copy of the notice upon entrance to the clinic.137
are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential
life, and are overruled.
Id. It is important to note, however, that Casey did not necessarily overrule Akron and
Thornburgh in their entirety. The words “[t]o the extent” suggest that there may be aspects of
Akron’s and Thornburgh’s compelled speech holdings that survive Casey. See Abner S.
Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1496 n.108
(2018).
128. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
129. See id. at 881–82.
130. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 2022).
131. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. The stated purpose of the FACT Act was to “ensure that California residents
make their personal reproductive health care decisions knowing their rights and the health care
services available to them.” Id. at 2369 (quoting 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 700, § 2 (West)).
135. See id. at 2368–70. The “licensed clinic” category covered licensed primary care or
specialty clinics, as well as those that qualified as intermittent clinics under California law.
See id. The “unlicensed clinic” category covered facilities that were not licensed under
California law, as well as those that did not have a licensed medical provider on staff. See id.
Both “licensed” and “unlicensed” facilities had to primarily provide family planning services.
See id.
136. Id. at 2369 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2018)).
137. See id. The FACT Act also required unlicensed centers to provide a notice stating that
“[t]his facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed
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Addressing the First Amendment challenge to the licensed notice
requirement, the Court first concluded that the requirement is a content-based
regulation of speech.138 The Court observed that “[b]y compelling
individuals to speak a particular message, such notices ‘alte[r] the content of
[their] speech.’”139 Although content-based regulations of speech typically
warrant strict scrutiny review, the Court recognized that it has afforded less
protection for professional speech in two circumstances: (1) where the
regulation requires professionals to disclose purely factual, uncontroversial
information in their commercial speech (“the Zauderer exception”) and (2)
where the statute regulates professional conduct, even though it incidentally
involves speech (“the Casey informed consent exception”).140
In reviewing the licensed notice requirement, the Court first concluded that
the Zauderer exception did not apply.141 Under Zauderer, states can require
the disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which . . . services will be available.”142 However, the Court
observed that the licensed notice requirement does not relate to the services
that the clinics provide.143 Even more, the requirement compels licensed
clinics to provide information about abortion, a topic the Court considers far
from uncontroversial.144
Moving to the Casey informed consent exception to strict scrutiny review,
the Court also held that this exception does not apply to the licensed notice
requirement.145 While Casey upheld regulations that compelled physician
speech to inform the consent of a woman seeking an abortion, the Court
concluded that the licensed notice requirement is not an informed consent
regulation at all.146 In fact, the required disclosure is not tied to a medical
procedure but instead applies to all interactions between a covered clinic and
its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure is sought.147 Even if a
covered clinic did provide medical procedures, the notice “provides no
information about the risks or benefits of those procedures.”148 Therefore,
the Court determined that the Casey informed consent exception to strict
scrutiny did not apply.149

medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.” Id. at 2370.
The Court’s discussion of the unlicensed notice requirement is beyond the scope of this Note.
138. See id. at 2371.
139. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 795 (1988)).
140. See id. at 2372.
141. See id. at 2372–74.
142. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
143. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 2373–74.
146. See id. at 2373.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 2373–74.
149. See id. at 2374. The Court concluded that the licensed notice requirement “regulates
speech as speech” rather than as part of the practice of medicine, subject to regulation by the
State. Id. at 2373–74.
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Although the Court concluded that the licensed notice requirement was a
content-based regulation and that the professional speech exceptions did not
apply, it proceeded to apply intermediate scrutiny—not strict scrutiny—to
assess the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement.150 The Court
assumed that California’s interest in providing low-income women with
information about state-sponsored medical services was substantial.151
Nevertheless, the Court determined that the licensed notice requirement was
not sufficiently narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.152 In so holding, the
Court noted that the notice requirement is underinclusive, compelling
disclosure at only a portion of clinics that serve low-income women.153 In
addition, California could inform women of its services without compelling
speech by, for example, running an advertising campaign.154 As a result, the
Court held that the licensed notice requirement violated the First
Amendment.155
In dissent, Justice Breyer noted the inconsistencies between the Court’s
holding in this case and its First Amendment holding in Casey.156 According
to Justice Breyer, there is no meaningful difference between the regulation
upheld in Casey that requires a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion
about adoption services and the requirement in the FACT Act that a medical
counselor tell a woman seeking prenatal care about abortion services.157
Although the majority attempted to distinguish Casey by arguing that it
applies only when obtaining informed consent to a specific medical
procedure, Justice Breyer contended that the distinction lacks force.158
While an abortion is certainly a medical procedure that involves particular
health risks, so too is carrying a child to term.159 According to Justice Breyer,
“[h]ealth considerations do not favor disclosure of alternatives and risks
associated with the [former] but not those associated with the [latter].”160 As
a result, Casey ought to apply equally to the licensed notice requirement,
rendering it a constitutional regulation of the practice of medicine.161
While abortion providers hoped that the Court would provide clarification
on Casey’s First Amendment holding in NIFLA, many questions remained

150. See id. at 2375. While the Court did not foreclose the possibility that another reason
existed for requiring a lower level of constitutional scrutiny for professional speech, it did not
address that issue because it determined that the licensed notice requirement could not survive
even intermediate scrutiny. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 2376.
155. See id. at 2378.
156. See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 2386.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 2379, 2386.
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unanswered following its decision,162 including whether mandatory narrated
ultrasounds are constitutional under the Court’s current compelled speech
framework.163
II. MANDATORY NARRATED ULTRASOUNDS: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION OF PHYSICIANS’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS?
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of a
number of abortion “informed consent” provisions,164 it has not yet
considered the constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions
under the First Amendment.165 Consequently, lower courts and scholars
have diverged on both how to apply Supreme Court jurisprudence to these
unique provisions and whether these provisions are ultimately
constitutional.166 This part outlines the debate that has permeated the lower
courts surrounding the constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound
provisions. Part II.A discusses the circuit split that developed prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA. Part II.B addresses the potential
implications of NIFLA on the constitutionality of mandatory narrated
ultrasound provisions.
A. Pre-NIFLA: Lower Courts Diverged on Constitutionality of Mandatory
Narrated Ultrasounds
In the 2012 case Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services
v. Lakey, the Fifth Circuit took up constitutional challenges by physicians
and abortion providers to Texas House Bill 15 (“H.B. 15”), an “informed
consent” law.167 H.B. 15 amended the 2003 Texas Woman’s Right to Know
Act168 with the stated intention of strengthening the informed consent of
women seeking abortions.169 The bill requires a physician performing an
abortion to perform a sonogram, display and describe the images, and play
the sound of the heartbeat of the fetus to any woman seeking an abortion.170
A woman may decline to hear the heartbeat or view the images, but she may
not decline to receive an explanation of the images unless her pregnancy falls

162. See Casey Adams, A Compelling Case: Exploring the Law of Disclosures After
NIFLA, 82 U. PITT. L. REV. 353, 356 (2020) (“However, it is not clear that all disclosure laws
must receive strict scrutiny after NIFLA.”).
163. See infra Part II.B.
164. See supra Parts I.B., I.D.
165. See supra note 30.
166. See infra Parts II.A–B.
167. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572 (5th
Cir. 2012).
168. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 2021).
169. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 573.
170. See id.
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into one of three exceptions.171 Physicians will lose their licenses for
violating any of these requirements.172
H.B. 15’s challengers argued that the law violates their First Amendment
free speech rights by compelling physicians to describe both the ultrasound
images and the sound of the heartbeat.173 They further alleged that the
compelled speech “serves no medical purpose, and indeed no other purpose
than to discourage the abortion.”174
Recognizing that these challenges implicate the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment holding in Casey, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
outlining its interpretation of the Casey holding.175 According to the Fifth
Circuit, Casey held that “physicians’ rights not to speak are, when ‘part of
the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State.’”176 Further, “[t]his applies to information that is ‘truthful,’
‘nonmisleading,’ and ‘relevant . . . to the decision’ to undergo an
abortion.”177 In other words, the Fifth Circuit suggested that informed
consent laws are permissible under Casey if they require the disclosure of
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant information because such laws are part
of the state’s reasonable regulation of the practice of medicine.178
Applying these principles to H.B. 15, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
law is constitutional under Casey’s First Amendment holding.179 The court
noted that the required disclosures under H.B. 15—medical descriptions of
the heartbeat and the sonogram images—are the “epitome of truthful,
non-misleading information.”180 In that sense, the mandatory disclosures are
no different than those upheld in Casey: disclosing the probable gestational
age of the fetus and providing printed materials showing a fetus’s prenatal
development.181 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the mandatory
narrated ultrasound provision falls within the State’s power to regulate the
practice of medicine under Casey and therefore does not violate the First
Amendment.182

171. See id. A pregnant woman may choose not to receive the verbal explanation if (1) the
pregnancy is the result of incest, sexual assault, or another violation of criminal law; (2) the
woman is a minor and is obtaining an abortion by judicial bypass; or (3) the fetus has an
irreversible medical condition. See id.; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 171.0122(d) (West 2021).
172. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 573.
173. See id. at 574.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 574–75. For a detailed discussion of Casey’s First Amendment holding, see
supra Part I.D.
176. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 884 (1992)).
177. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)).
178. See id. at 576.
179. See id. at 577.
180. Id. at 578.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 580.
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Professors Scott W. Gaylord and Thomas J. Molony endorsed the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of Casey and its application to mandatory narrated
ultrasound laws.183 Like the Fifth Circuit in Lakey, Professors Gaylor and
Molony describe Casey as permitting informed consent provisions that
require the disclosure of truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant
information.184 In their view, mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions, like
the one at issue in Lakey, fit neatly into this framework.185 In fact, they
suggest that the mandatory narrated ultrasound provides the epitome of
truthful, nonmisleading information about the development and gestational
age of the fetus.186 Further, they opine that the mandatory narrated
ultrasound might even be the most direct and nonmisleading way that the
government can ensure that a woman seeking an abortion fully understands
the consequences of her decision.187 Ultimately, this interpretation of Casey
and its application to the mandatory narrated ultrasound fully endorses the
analysis set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Lakey.
However, two years after Lakey, the Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Camnitz
came to the opposite conclusion when it considered constitutional challenges
to North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act188 (the “Right to Know
Act”). The Right to Know Act required a physician to perform an ultrasound,
within seventy-two hours of the abortion, on any woman seeking an
abortion.189 The Right to Know Act further obligated the physician to
display the ultrasound and describe the fetus in detail, including the presence
of any organs and the location and dimensions of the unborn child, and to
offer to allow the woman to hear the heartbeat.190 The woman could,
however, look away from the images and refuse to listen to the medical
description by covering her ears.191 The only statutory exception to these
disclosure requirements was medical emergencies.192
Beginning its analysis of the constitutionality of the mandatory narrated
ultrasound provision under the First Amendment, the Fourth Circuit first
grappled with the requisite level of scrutiny to apply to the law.193 To start,
the court noted that the requirement is “quintessential compelled speech” that
“forces physicians to say things they otherwise would not say.”194 In that
sense, the requirement is a content-based regulation of speech that typically
183. See Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know:
Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 640–41
(2012).
184. See id. at 640.
185. See id. at 641.
186. See id. at 642.
187. See id.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.80 (West 2021).
189. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2014).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 244–45.
194. Id. at 246. The court also noted that the compelled statement is ideological in nature
because it conveys the State’s admitted purpose: to dissuade women from seeking abortions.
See id. at 245–46.
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receives strict scrutiny review under Supreme Court jurisprudence.195
However, the court also recognized that the requirement is part of the
regulation of the practice of medicine, which typically only needs to satisfy
rational basis review.196 Determining that the mandatory narrated ultrasound
provision falls between a content-based regulation of speech and a regulation
of professional conduct, the Fourth Circuit concluded that intermediate
scrutiny is the most appropriate constitutional standard to apply to the
provision.197
Under intermediate scrutiny, the state bears the burden of proving that the
law at issue is drawn to achieve a substantial government interest.198 First
addressing the state’s interest in protecting fetal life, the Fourth Circuit
conceded that this interest is an important one.199 The court also presumed
that the mandatory narrated ultrasound provision protects fetal life by
discouraging women from seeking abortions.200 Nevertheless, the court
found that the provision failed to “directly advance the [government’s]
interest without impeding too greatly on individual liberty interests.”201 The
court reasoned that the provision interferes with a physician’s First
Amendment rights beyond the extent permitted for reasonable regulation of
medical conduct, while also threatening the patient’s mental health and
jeopardizing the doctor-patient relationship.202 Therefore, the court held that
the provision was unconstitutional.203
Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its decision about the
applicable standard of review departs from the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
Lakey, the court noted that it was not convinced by Lakey’s reasoning.204 To
start, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the Fifth Circuit stretched the
single-paragraph First Amendment holding in Casey far beyond its
reasonable interpretation.205 Contrary to Lakey’s conclusion that Casey
announced a sweeping standard of rational basis review for all regulations of
medical speech involving abortion, the Fourth Circuit contended that the
Casey plurality merely found no issue with the particular compelled speech
provisions challenged in that case.206 According to the Fourth Circuit, “[t]hat
195. See id. at 246; see also supra Part I.C (explaining the Supreme Court’s compelled
speech jurisprudence in Wooley).
196. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246–47. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has
long recognized the state’s power to prescribe regulations for professions, including medicine.
See id. at 247. Importantly, the state’s authority to regulate the medical profession is not lost
when a regulation entails speech. See id. In fact, the state can require the disclosure of
information necessary to inform the consent of patients receiving a medical procedure. See id.
197. See id. at 248–49.
198. See id. at 250.
199. See id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the state has an important interest
in preserving and protecting fetal life. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 248.
205. See id. 248–49.
206. See id. at 249.
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particularized finding hardly announces a guiding standard of scrutiny for
use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving abortion.”207
Finally, the Fourth Circuit differentiated the mandatory narrated
ultrasound provision in the Right to Know Act from the informed consent
provisions upheld by the Supreme Court in Casey.208 First, unlike the Casey
requirements, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the mandatory narrated
ultrasound provision did not inform a woman’s consent to an abortion since
the provision allows a woman to cover her eyes and ears during the
narration.209 Second, while a physician operating under the Pennsylvania
law in Casey need only inform the patient of the availability of certain
materials, a physician operating under North Carolina’s Right to Know Act
must “speak and display the very information on a volatile subject that the
state would like to convey.”210 According to the Fourth Circuit, the First
Amendment threat is greater when a regulation, like the mandatory narrated
ultrasound provision, requires the physician to “deliver the state’s preferred
message in his or her own voice.”211 Lastly, unlike the informed consent
provisions in Casey, the mandatory narrated ultrasound provision finds the
patient in a uniquely vulnerable position—disrobed on her back on an
examination table.212 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the setting
itself conveys a message, not of the risks and benefits of the procedure but of
the “full weight of the state’s moral condemnation.”213
Other scholars agree with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that mandatory
narrated ultrasound provisions are not “informed consent” under Casey and
thus are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.214 Professor Jessica
Silbey takes a critical view of narrated ultrasounds, arguing that they do not
fit within traditional notions of informed consent.215 According to Professor
Silbey, informed consent laws typically require the disclosure of
“information relevant to the medical procedure, which includes the reason
for and the nature of the medical procedure, its likelihood of success, its
material risks, any alternatives, and the consequences of doing nothing.”216
Under her characterization of informed consent, the display of laboratory
results is rarely part of the information provided to patients.217 Additionally,
207. Id.
208. See id. at 252–55.
209. See id. at 252.
210. Id. at 253.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 255.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Picturing Moral Arguments in a Fraught Legal Arena:
Fetuses, Photographic Phantoms and Ultrasounds, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 593, 607–08
(2015); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012).
215. See Silbey, supra note 214, at 607–08.
216. Id. at 607.
217. See id. Professor Silbey illustrates her point by analogizing abortions to other medical
procedures. See id. She notes that “showing patients the contents of their bodies (e.g., an
inflamed appendix) or a video of their impending procedure (e.g., to replace a heart valve)
would be unnecessary to procure informed consent for a patient choosing to undergo an
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Professor Silbey urges that the purpose of mandatory narrated ultrasound
laws is not to inform but rather to “speak against abortion through the
woman’s physician,” which is impermissible under the First Amendment.218
Ian Vandewalker, senior counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice, takes a
similar position on mandatory narrated ultrasound laws.219 According to
Vandewalker, mandatory narrated ultrasound laws are “biased counseling
laws” because they are not intended to inform a woman’s consent but rather
are intended to discourage a woman from going through with an abortion.220
Vandewalker notes that “every abortion patient understands that the
procedure will terminate her pregnancy.”221 As such, a mandatory narrated
ultrasound does not offer any new information that could possibly inform the
consent of a woman seeking an abortion.222 Given that there is no evidence
that women would make different decisions due to a mandatory narrated
ultrasound, these laws cannot be justified under the umbrella of “informed
consent.”223
The stark differences between the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey and the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart highlight the robust debate concerning the
constitutionality of mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions under the First
Amendment that developed pre-NIFLA. Given the lack of clarity from the
Supreme Court on medical speech involving abortions, lower courts and
scholars have both diverged in their application of the Casey “informed
consent” holding to mandatory narrated ultrasounds.
B. Post-NIFLA: Clarity or Continuing Controversy?
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court recently addressed a First
Amendment challenge to an abortion “informed consent” provision in
NIFLA.224 While the Court presented a framework for analyzing abortion
regulations under the First Amendment, it did not specifically address
mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions.225 Therefore, the Court left room
for the lower courts to experiment with applying NIFLA to mandatory
narrated ultrasounds. This section discusses the lower courts’ compelled

appendectomy or open-heart surgery.” Id. Instead, Professor Silbey argues that these images
“might actually be an inadvisable deterrent that causes unhealthy anguish, anxiety, and delay”
for patients undergoing medical procedures. Id.
218. Id. at 608. According to Professor Silbey, mandatory narrated ultrasounds distort the
doctor-patient relationship by forcing the physician to persuade the patient to choose the
state-endorsed route—to not terminate the pregnancy. See id. at 610. In this way, “the state
misleads women by cloaking its message in the perceived neutrality of doctor’s speech and
imaging technology.” Id.
219. See Vandewalker, supra note 214, at 3. Although Vandewalker’s main argument is
that mandatory narrated ultrasounds and other “biased counseling laws” violate standards of
medical ethics, he also acknowledges that they violate the First Amendment. See id. at 3–4.
220. See id. at 3.
221. Id. at 47.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 48.
224. See supra Part I.D.
225. See supra Part I.D.
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speech jurisprudence involving abortions following NIFLA and highlights
the ongoing controversy surrounding the constitutionality of mandatory
narrated ultrasounds.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA, the Sixth Circuit had an
opportunity to apply the Court’s decision to a mandatory narrated ultrasound
provision passed by the Kentucky state legislature.226 In EMW Women’s
Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshear, the Sixth Circuit considered a First
Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”).227 H.B. 2
requires a doctor to perform an ultrasound, during which the doctor must
display and describe the images for the patient, on any woman seeking an
abortion.228 However, the patient is free to look away or cover her ears.229
Additionally, the doctor must play the sound of the heartbeat but may turn
off the volume at the patient’s request.230
Turning to the constitutional challenge, the Sixth Circuit centered its First
Amendment analysis on the Supreme Court’s primary holding in NIFLA.
The court noted that NIFLA recognized two exceptions to strict scrutiny
review of compelled speech: (1) the Zauderer exception for commercial
disclosures of factual, noncontroversial information and (2) the Casey
exception for regulations of professional conduct that incidentally involve
speech.231 The court determined that the mandatory narrated ultrasound
provision implicated the latter of the two exceptions since it regulates
doctors’ conduct.232
The Sixth Circuit proceeded to define the Casey exception in its own
terms. According to the Sixth Circuit, Casey marked a shift toward “greater
respect for States’ interests in informing women,” as evidenced by the
plurality’s acknowledgement that, although a physician’s First Amendment
rights were implicated by the informed consent statute, a physician’s First
Amendment rights were implicated only as part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable regulation by the State.233 The Sixth Circuit then
declared that the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in NIFLA when it
explained that regulations of professional conduct are subject to lower
constitutional scrutiny—as compared to other regulations compelling
speech.234 Ultimately, the court concluded that the Casey exception, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in NIFLA, applies to statutes that facilitate
informed consent to a medical procedure because they regulate speech only
as part of the practice of medicine, which the state can reasonably regulate.235
226. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 423 (6th Cir.
2019).
227. See id. at 424; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2022).
228. See EMW Women’s Surgical Center, 920 F.3d at 424. The description can include
pointing out any organs and identifying whether the patient is pregnant with twins. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 426.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 427–28.
234. See id. at 428.
235. See id.
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The Sixth Circuit then held that it would not review an informed consent
statute under strict scrutiny, so long as it meets three requirements: “(1) it
must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must be truthful and not misleading;
and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision whether to undertake the
procedure.”236 In other words, if the mandatory narrated ultrasound
provision meets those three requirements, then it is sufficiently similar to the
informed consent provision in Casey and therefore is not subject to strict
scrutiny review.237
Beginning with the first requirement, the Sixth Circuit held that H.B. 2
clearly relates to the medical procedure of abortion.238 Moving to the second
requirement, the court held that the mandated disclosures are clearly truthful
and not misleading.239 According to the court, there can be no assertion that
anatomical images and descriptions are either false or misleading.240 Lastly,
the court determined that the required disclosures are relevant to the patient’s
decision about whether to undertake the procedure.241 The information
conveyed through the ultrasound gives the patient more knowledge about the
unborn fetus.242 According to the court, the fact that this information might
dissuade a woman from going through with the abortion simply means that
it is relevant to her decision.243 With all three factors met, the court
concluded that, although the statute compels physicians to disclose certain
information, it does not violate physicians’ First Amendment rights because
the disclosures sufficiently inform patient consent and thus fall within the
reasonable regulation of professional conduct.244
Although the Sixth Circuit is the only appellate court that has applied
NIFLA to a mandatory narrated ultrasound provision, some have suggested
that the interaction between NIFLA and Casey, as it relates to abortion
“informed consent” laws under the First Amendment, is not so
straightforward.245 Professor Abner S. Greene argues that the holding in
NIFLA is “in some tension” with the holding in Casey that upheld various
“informed consent” provisions, drawing from Justice Breyer’s NIFLA
dissent.246 While Casey upheld a provision that required physicians to tell
the woman about the availability of printed materials discussing adoption
services and child care, NIFLA invalidated a law that required medical
providers to tell a woman seeking prenatal care about abortion services.247
To reconcile this inconsistency, Professor Greene suggests that the Court
236. Id.
237. See id. at 429.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 429–30.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 430.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 432.
245. See Greene, supra note 127, at 1496; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2385–86 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Greene, supra note 127, at 1496.
247. See id.; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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should maintain its licensed notice holding in NIFLA but revise its compelled
speech holding in Casey to invalidate the portions of the law that go beyond
providing informed consent to the abortion procedure and move to providing
alternatives to receiving an abortion.248
Because the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA inadvertently created
tension with its First Amendment holding in Casey, the constitutionality of
mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions, as well as the correct test to apply
to these provisions, remains unclear.
III. MANDATORY NARRATED ULTRASOUNDS: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe, state legislatures
have passed restrictive abortion laws under the guise of informed consent to
attack the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.249 Some of these
regulations require physicians to perform mandatory narrated ultrasounds,
which have been challenged as violations of the First Amendment.250 As it
stands now, the Supreme Court’s abortion informed consent framework,
without further clarity, is inadequate to address the First Amendment issues
raised by mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions.251
Pre-NIFLA, circuit courts diverged on how to apply the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment holding in Casey to mandatory narrated ultrasound
provisions.252 Specifically, courts struggled with whether the mandatory
narrated ultrasound fell within the Casey informed consent exception to strict
scrutiny review and was thus constitutional under rational basis review.253
The Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA further complicated the inquiry by
issuing a seemingly incompatible holding to its Casey First Amendment
decision.254 Therefore, to address the constitutionality of mandatory narrated
ultrasounds, further clarification of the Supreme Court’s precedents in
NILFA and Casey is warranted.
This part proposes a more streamlined approach that lower courts can use
when analyzing First Amendment challenges to mandatory narrated
ultrasound provisions, as well as opportunities for the Supreme Court to
clarify its current jurisprudence. Part III.A argues that a straightforward
application of NIFLA to mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions renders
those regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Part III.B
acknowledges the inconsistencies between Casey and NIFLA and argues that,
248. See Greene, supra note 127, at 1496–97.
249. See supra Part I.B. (explaining the responses by state legislatures to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Roe).
250. See supra Part II (outlining various First Amendment challenges to mandatory
narrated ultrasound provisions).
251. See supra Part II.
252. See supra Part II.A (discussing the circuit split on the question of whether mandatory
narrated ultrasound provisions violate the First Amendment).
253. See supra Part II.A.
254. See supra Part II.B (illustrating the competing interpretations of NIFLA and its
interaction with Casey).
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in the interest of clarity, the Supreme Court should revise its compelled
speech holding in Casey to invalidate the portions of the challenged law that
go beyond providing information about the medical risks and benefits of the
abortion procedure. Lastly, Part III.C argues that, even without a Casey
revision, the mandatory narrated ultrasound is distinguishable from the
provisions upheld in Casey and is thus unconstitutional.
A. Applying NIFLA: Mandatory Narrated Ultrasounds Are Not Informed
Consent
Although the Supreme Court only broadly addressed abortion informed
consent provisions in NIFLA,255 the Court’s compelled speech framework is
nonetheless instructive in the context of mandatory narrated ultrasounds.
This section argues that, under the principles set forth in NIFLA, the
mandatory narrated ultrasound is unconstitutional and violates physicians’
free speech rights.
As previously discussed, NIFLA addressed a First Amendment challenge
to California’s FACT Act, which required pro-life crisis pregnancy centers
to post a notice about the availability of family planning services, including
abortion.256 Recognizing that the law compelled physician speech, the
Supreme Court turned to which level of scrutiny to apply.257 Although the
Supreme Court noted that it has applied lower scrutiny to medical speech in
two contexts—the Zauderer exception and the Casey exception258—the
Court determined that neither exception applied to the provision at issue.259
First, the Zauderer exception did not apply because the law compelled clinics
to provide information about abortion, a topic that is far from
uncontroversial.260 Second, the Casey informed consent exception did not
apply because the notice provided no information about the risks or benefits
of a medical procedure.261 Therefore, the Court determined that a higher
level of scrutiny must apply.262 Although the Court did not specify which
level of heightened scrutiny to apply, it invalidated the law under
intermediate scrutiny.263

255. See supra Part I.D.
256. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 2022); see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2368–70 (2018).
257. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
258. See id. at 2372 (outlining cases where the Court applied a lower level of constitutional
scrutiny to regulations compelling speech).
259. See id. at 2372–74.
260. See id. at 2373. As discussed above, the Court in Zauderer held that the government
could require disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial” information, and these
mandates did not run afoul of the First Amendment. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary
Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also supra Part I.C (discussing the Court’s compelled
commercial speech holding in Zauderer).
261. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74; see also supra Part I.A (explaining the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey and the right to terminate a pregnancy under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
262. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
263. See id. at 2375–78.
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Applying this framework to mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions,
these regulations do not pass constitutional muster under the First
Amendment. Just as the Zauderer exception did not apply to the licensed
notice requirement in NIFLA, it also does not apply to the mandatory narrated
ultrasound, since both provisions compel abortion-related speech, which is
far from uncontroversial.264 Even the Sixth Circuit, which upheld a
mandatory narrated ultrasound provision in EMW Women’s Surgical Center,
recognized that the Zauderer exception does not apply to compelled speech
in the abortion context.265
Similarly, the Casey informed consent exception does not apply. Just as
the licensed notice requirement did not provide information about the
medical risks and benefits of a procedure,266 neither does the mandatory
narrated ultrasound. As previously discussed, the display of images and
laboratory results is rarely part of the information provided to patients prior
to undergoing an operation.267 In fact, as Professor Silbey notes, showing
patients the contents of their bodies is completely unnecessary to informed
consent and is utterly detached from traditional notions of informed consent
in the medical field generally.268 Additionally, the narrated ultrasound
provides no new information to a woman seeking an abortion.269 As
Vandewalker correctly points out, every abortion patient already understands
that the procedure will terminate her pregnancy.270 Therefore, the mandatory
narrated ultrasound does not provide any information that further informs the
consent of the woman.271 Lastly, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Stuart, the
mandatory narrated ultrasound does not inform a woman’s consent since a
woman is frequently allowed to cover her eyes and ears during the
narration.272 By permitting a woman to refuse to listen to the narration, states
with mandatory narrated ultrasound laws practically concede that the
narrated ultrasound is not necessary to inform the consent of a woman
seeking an abortion.
Since neither of the exceptions to strict scrutiny review apply, NIFLA
instructs courts to apply some form of heightened scrutiny to the mandatory
narrated ultrasound.273 Just as the licensed notice requirement in NIFLA did

264. See Demonstrators Rally Outside Supreme Court During Arguments in Mississippi
Abortion Case, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2021, 10:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/picturegallery/news/politics/2021/12/01/demonstrators-rally-supreme-court-hears-mississippiabortion-case-dobbs-jackson-womens-health/8821414002/ [https://perma.cc/PY9L-YCS2]
(picturing both abortion rights activists and antiabortion activists outside the Supreme Court
during the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization oral arguments).
265. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 426 (6th Cir.
2019); see also supra Part II.B (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of NIFLA).
266. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74.
267. See Silbey, supra note 214, at 607–08.
268. See id. at 607.
269. See Vandewalker, supra note 214, at 47.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 252 (4th Cir. 2014).
273. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018).
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not survive intermediate scrutiny,274 neither does the mandatory narrated
ultrasound.275 Following the Fourth Circuit’s intermediate scrutiny analysis
from Stuart, the mandatory narrated ultrasound fails to directly advance a
substantial government interest.276 Although the state’s interest in protecting
fetal life is substantial, the mandatory narrated ultrasound does not directly
advance that interest.277 As discussed above, the provision interferes with a
physician’s First Amendment rights beyond the extent permitted for
reasonable regulation of medical conduct278 because the provision does not
further the informed consent of a woman seeking an abortion.279 Therefore,
mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions are unconstitutional under NIFLA.
B. Reconciling Casey and NIFLA in Light of Mandatory Narrated
Ultrasounds
As previously discussed, there are some inconsistencies between the
Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA and its First Amendment holding in
Casey.280 This tension is due to the fact that NIFLA defined “informed
consent” narrowly, including only the benefits and risks of a medical
procedure,281 while Casey upheld a wider array of “informed consent”
provisions.282 As a result, NIFLA invalidated a licensed notice requirement
that compelled crisis centers to post notices about the availability of abortion
services,283 while Casey upheld an informed consent provision that required
a physician to inform any woman seeking an abortion about the availability
of materials detailing alternatives to an abortion.284
Since NIFLA’s narrow definition of “informed consent” is more consistent
with traditional notions of informed consent in the medical field, as
evidenced by its application to the mandatory narrated ultrasound,285 the
Supreme Court should clarify its abortion informed consent jurisprudence by
adopting Professor Greene’s suggested revision to Casey.286 As Professor
274. See id. at 2375–78.
275. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 250 (outlining the Fourth Circuit’s application of intermediate
scrutiny to a mandatory narrated ultrasound provision).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See supra Part II.A.
280. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2385–86 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If a State can
lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services, why
should it not be able, as here, to require a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal
care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?”); see also
Greene, supra note 127, at 1496–97 (highlighting the tension between the Court’s decisions
in Casey and NIFLA and proposing that the Court revise its holding in Casey to address the
inconsistencies).
281. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
282. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–84 (1992).
283. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
284. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–84.
285. See supra Part III.A (arguing that mandatory narrated ultrasounds fail NIFLA’s test
for informed consent because the ultrasounds do not fit within traditional notions of informed
consent).
286. See Greene, supra note 127, at 1496–97.
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Greene suggests, the Court should maintain its holding in NIFLA but revise
its First Amendment holding in Casey to invalidate the portions of the law
that go beyond providing information about the medical risks and benefits of
the procedure and instead require the sharing of information about
alternatives to an abortion.287
In amending its First Amendment holding in Casey, the Supreme Court
has an opportunity to clarify its definition of “informed consent” and set forth
a streamlined test for analyzing abortion compelled speech provisions,
mirroring the framework outlined in Part III.A. By clarifying the definition
of “informed consent,” these proposed revisions can also help to settle the
debate among lower courts and scholars about the constitutionality of
mandatory narrated ultrasounds.288
C. Mandatory Narrated Ultrasounds Are Distinguishable from the
Provisions Upheld in Casey
Although the Casey revision proposed in Part III.B would provide the most
comprehensive solution to the ongoing confusion about the constitutionality
of abortion “informed consent” provisions more broadly, this Note’s
conclusion that mandatory narrated ultrasounds are unconstitutional does not
hinge on a revision of Casey. Even if the Supreme Court fails to clarify its
definition of “informed consent” by revising Casey’s First Amendment
holding, mandatory narrated ultrasounds are distinguishable from the
provisions upheld in Casey and are thus unconstitutional regardless of the
inconsistencies between Casey and NIFLA.
While some scholars agree that disclosure of information about
alternatives to a medical procedure can be a part of informed consent,289 it is
clear that the mandatory narrated ultrasound does not inform the consent of
a woman to an abortion at all.290 As discussed above, the mandatory narrated
ultrasound does not fit within traditional notions of informed consent and
does not provide the patient with any new information about the procedure
that would inform her consent to an abortion.291 In this way, the mandatory
narrated ultrasound is distinguishable from the provisions upheld by the
Supreme Court in Casey under the “informed consent” exception to strict
scrutiny review.292
More fundamentally, the provisions upheld in Casey and the mandatory
narrated ultrasound provisions differ in how they compel the physician to

287. See id.
288. See supra Part II.
289. See Silbey, supra note 214, at 607–08; see also Sawicki, supra note 21, at 19
(“Information relevant to this decision-making process includes the nature of the procedure or
intervention, its likelihood of success, its material risks, any alternatives—including their
likelihood of success and their risks—and the consequences of doing nothing as an option.”).
290. See supra Part III.A (arguing that mandatory narrated ultrasounds do not provide any
information that informs the consent of a woman seeking an abortion).
291. See supra Part III.A.
292. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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speak.293 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Stuart, while a physician operating
under the Pennsylvania law in Casey need only inform the patient about the
availability of certain materials, a physician operating under a mandatory
narrated ultrasound provision must “speak and display the very information
on a volatile subject that the state would like to convey.”294 Importantly,
“[t]he coercive effects of the speech are magnified when the physician is
compelled to deliver the state’s preferred message in his or her own voice,”
rendering mandatory narrated ultrasounds far more intrusive of physicians’
First Amendment rights than the provisions upheld in Casey.295
Thus, even if the Supreme Court does not revise its Casey First
Amendment holding, courts must still apply some level of heightened
scrutiny to mandatory narrated ultrasound provisions because of the
meaningful differences between mandatory narrated ultrasounds and the
provisions upheld in Casey.296 As previously discussed, mandatory narrated
ultrasounds do not even survive intermediate scrutiny and thus are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.297
CONCLUSION
In an era of widespread abortion regulation, the First Amendment has
become an important avenue through which litigants can challenge the
constitutionality of various abortion “informed consent” regulations,
including mandatory narrated ultrasounds. However, First Amendment
challenges to mandatory narrated ultrasounds have received mixed results in
the lower courts, in part due to a lack of clarity from the Supreme Court about
how to apply Casey and NIFLA—its controlling precedents in the abortion
informed consent context.
The ongoing debate about the constitutionality of mandatory narrated
ultrasounds highlights the need for a streamlined framework under which
courts can assess the constitutionality of abortion provisions that compel
physician speech. By applying NIFLA’s narrow definition of informed
consent to mandatory narrated ultrasounds, lower courts can invalidate
provisions that improperly infringe on physicians’ free speech rights. While
the Supreme Court should revise its First Amendment holding in Casey and
clarify its definition of “informed consent,” mandatory narrated ultrasound
provisions are still unlikely to pass constitutional muster under NIFLA. State
legislatures may continue to push back against a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy, but they cannot do so in a way that impermissibly compels
physician speech.

293. See supra Part II (outlining the circuit courts’ various interpretations of the Supreme
Court’s compelled speech and abortion jurisprudence).
294. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014).
295. See id.
296. See supra Parts II.A, III.C.
297. See supra Part III.A (applying the Fourth Circuit’s intermediate scrutiny to the
mandatory narrated ultrasound).

